Legal Barriers to Worker Participation in Management Decision Making by St. Antoine, Theodore J.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1984
Legal Barriers to Worker Participation in
Management Decision Making
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School, tstanton@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/491
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Courts Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legislation Commons,
and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "Legal Barriers to Worker Participation in Management Decision Making." Tul. L. Rev. 58 (1984): 1301-21.
LEGAL BARRIERS TO WORKER PARTICIPATION
IN MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUTORY DUTY TO BARGAIN
Collective bargaining lies at the heart of the union-manage-
ment relationship. It is the end and purpose of the whole effort
to protect employees against reprisals when they form an organi-
zation to represent them in dealing with their employers. Collec-
tive bargaining is grounded in the belief that industrial strife
will be checked, and the workers' lot bettered, if workers are
given an effective voice in determining the conditions of their
employment.1 My thesis is that federal law, even while placing
the force of government behind collective bargaining, has so arti-
ficially confined its scope that the process has been seriously im-
peded from achieving its full potential.
One of the most disarmingly simple provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is section 8(a)(5),2 which
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively" with a union representing its employees.
Strangely, Senator Wagner's original "labor disputes" bill, as re-
ported from committee in 1934,3 contained no explicit require-
ment of collective bargaining, although the Senator believed it
was implicit in the employees' right to organize.4 Some felt that
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.,
Fordham College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954.
1. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 15 (1949) (statement of Sen. Robert
Wagner) [hereinafter cited as LEG. 1 HIST. NLRA]; id. at 10351, 10559; 1 LEG. HIST.
NLRA at 1117, 1122 (remarks of Sen. Walsh) (illustrating belief that collective bargain-
ing reduces employer-employee conflict, checks economic waste, and promotes economic
recovery).
2. 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1976)).
3. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in I LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note
1, at 1070. See also S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.
NLRA, supra note 1, at 1295.
4. Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1935, at 2490 (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner) [herein-
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imposing a statutory duty to bargain would amount to no more
than a pious exhortation. Sumner Slichter, for example, causti-
cally likened it to legislating "that the lions and lambs shall not
fail to exert every reasonable effort to lie down together." 5 Other
labor experts took a different tack, opposing "legislation by im-
plication ' 6 and insisting that failure to mandate collective bar-
gaining "omits the very guts" of the organizational process.7 The
views of the latter prevailed and their recommended language
was accepted.8
Yet what exactly had been done was left uncertain. The
NLRA's two leading proponents diverged sharply over the
meaning of the duty to bargain. Senator Wagner, the Act's spon-
sor, thought it would obligate an employer to "negotiate in good
faith" and "make every reasonable effort to reach an agree-
ment."9 Senator Walsh, the chairman of the Senate Labor Com-
mittee, felt instead that the parties would merely be required to
after cited as 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA].
5. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT.
NLRA, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Dr. Sumner Slichter, Professor of Economics,
Harvard University).
6. Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 4, at 2649
(statement of Francis Biddle, Chairman, NLRB).
7. National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA,
supra note 1, at 1517 (statement of Lloyd Garrison, Dean of Law School, University of
Wisconsin). See also id. at 79-80, 136-37 (1935), 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 1, at
1455-56, 1516-17 (statements of Francis Biddle, Chairman, NLRB, and Lloyd K. Garri-
son); To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm.
on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT.
NLRA, supra note 1, at 264 (statement of William M. Leiserson, Chairman, Petroleum
Labor Policy Board).
8. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT.
NLRA, supra note 4, at 2312; H. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935), re-
printed in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 4, at 3069. See generally Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law
in Search of Policy, 6a4 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 252-53 (1964); Fleming, The Obligation to
Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, Good
Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (1968) (dis-
cussing collective bargaining cases, analyzing the tests used in determing if the good
faith standard has been met, and examining alternative means of evaluating collective
bargaining); Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law,
39 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1084-86 (1941).
9. 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935) (citing Houde Eng'g Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35
(1934)), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 4, at 2336 (statement of Sen. Rob-
ert Wagner).
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get together, to meet and confer. "The bill," said he, "does not
go beyond the office door."' 0 These contrasting positions pre-
saged a long and continuing debate. An influential pair of arti-
cles in 1950 by Archibald Cox and John Dunlop"' insisted that
the Wagner Act was concerned with "organization for bargain-
ing-not with the scope of the ensuing negotiations."' 2 They la-
mented that the NLRB, with judicial endorsement, had em-
barked on the mission of "defining the scope of collective
bargaining."' 3 Eventually, nevertheless, Senator Wagner's con-
cept of a duty to bargain in good faith prevailed." Even so, as
late as 1961 a distinguished labor study group branded the bar-
gaining requirement "unrealistic," adding that "the provisions
designed to bring 'good faith' have become a tactical weapon
used in many situations as a means of harassment."'
Over the years, however, there has been increasing evidence
that the statute has had a positive practical effect, including vol-
untary compliance by management. One survey revealed that
successful bargaining relationships were eventually established
in seventy-five percent of the cases sampled that were pursued
to a final Board order as well as in ninety percent of the cases
that were voluntarily adjusted after the issuance of a com-
plaint.16 Although a recalcitrant offender can drag his heels with
impunity, because a Board order to bargain operates only pro-
spectively and ordinarily does not furnish any monetary relief,17
10. 79 CONG. REC. 7659 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRB, supra note 4, at
2373.
11. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Re-
latons Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 394 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Cox & Dunlop,
Regulation]; Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an
Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L.- REV. 1097 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Cox &
Dunlop, Duty to Bargain].
12. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation, supra note 11, at 394 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 397.
14. E.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
15. LABOR STUDY GROUP, COMM. FOR ECONoMIc DEV., THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NA-
TIONAL LABOR POLICY 82 (1961). The members of the Study Group were Clark Kerr,
Chairman, Douglass V. Brown, David L. Cole, John T. Dunlop, William Y. Elliot, Albert
Rees, Robert M. Solow, Philip Taft, and George W. Taylor.
16. P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 180-230 (1965); see
also McCulloch, The Development of Administrative Remedies, 14 LAB. L.J. 339, 348
(1963) (discussing the NLRB's stewardship of collective bargaining).
17. See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Local 347 (Heck's, Inc.), 417 U.S. 1 (1974);
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Tiidee Prods., Inc. 194 N.L.R.B. 1234
(1972), enforced, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (courts
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the majority of American employers and unions are law-abiding.
However hard it may be to identify "good faith" and to classify
legally such particular tactics as "take-it-or-leave-it" bargain-
ing,' it would seem almost perverse at this late date to deny
that, overall, the statutory duty to negotiate has had a salutary
impact.
Nonetheless, important problems remain. This paper will
focus on one of the most crucial: the subject matter about which
the NLRA mandates bargaining.
II. MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
The pro-union Congress that passed the Wagner Act in 1935
and imposed thereby the duty to bargain did not see fit to define
that duty. This lack was remedied, in a manner of speaking, by
the pro-management Congress that enacted the Taft-Hartley
amendments in 1947. A code of union unfair labor practices was
adopted, and unions, like employers, were made subject to a
duty to bargain. A new section, section 8(d),"' was added to the
NLRA, declaring that to "bargain collectively" meant the "mu-
tual obligation" of employer and union to confer "in good faith"
with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." Section 8(d) also took pains to state that no party
would be under a compulsion to "agree to a proposal" or make
any concessions. If the House of Representatives had its way,
the statute would have been much more specific, even definitive,
in enumerating the subjects of bargaining. In so doing, the Act
would have made clear, as the House Labor Committee put it,
that a union had "no right to bargain with the employer about
• ..how he shall manage his business ....",0
The more general language that was finally adopted was
seen as a confirmation of the course that the Labor Board had
been following.2' That course was for the Board itself to define
refused to expand the Board's grant of relief to operate retroactively).
18. E.g., Gen. Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1962), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
19. 61 Stat. 136, 142-43 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 8 (1948).
20. H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.
LMRA, supra note 19, at 313-14.
21. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation, supra note 11, at 400-01. See also post-1947
[Vol. 581304
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for employers and unions the "mandatory" subjects of bargain-
ing about which either party could be required to negotiate at
the behest of the other.2 Moreover, if a topic was mandatory, a
party could require an agreement on it as the price of any con-
tract. Stated differently, negotiations could be carried to the
point of impasse or stalemate on such an issue. Matters outside
this charmed circle of mandatory subjects were merely "permis-
sive." The parties could negotiate concerning such topics if both
sides were willing, but neither party could insist on bargaining
over them if the other party objected. These permissive topics
could not be the basis for an impasse or deadlock in
negotiations.2 3
The Supreme Court was eventually called upon to appraise
this scheme in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 4
The facts of Borg-Warner were curiously atypical. An employer
demanded that its collective bargaining agreement contain, inter
alia, a clause requiring a vote of the employees by secret ballot
before the union could go on strike. A majority of the Supreme
Court held first that the "ballot" clause related to a matter of
purely internal union concern, and was thus not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Then, in a step not logically necessitated
by section 8(d) and highly dubious as a matter of healthy indus-
trial relations, the Court agreed with the NLRB that the em-
ployer's insistence on a "permissive" clause as a condition of
agreement amounted in effect to an unlawful refusal to bargain
on mandatory subjects.
At least two other approaches might have made more sense.
I am told the lead attorney for the company in Borg-Warner
seriously considered arguing for the most straight-forward solu-
tion, which would have been the obliteration of the whole
mandatory-permissive distinction.25 Under this approach, any
cases cited infra note 22.
22. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pensions); J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946),
enforced, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) (merit increases).
23. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 496-98 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as R. GORMAN]; 1 C. MORRIS,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 761-64 (2d ed. 1983) (explaining the distinction between
mandatory and permissive matters for collective bargaining).
24. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
25. Conversation with James C. Davis, Esq., of Cleveland, Ohio, about litigation
strategy of company counsel in the Borg-Warner case (1960).
1984] 1305
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topic put on the table by either party would have triggered the
duty of good faith negotiating. The other party, it should be em-
phasized, would never be obligated to agree, only to bargain.
Why, after all, should a federal agency, rather than the parties
themselves, determine whether a particular item is so important
that it is worth a strike or a lockout? The subject matter of col-
lective bargaining ought to be flexible rather than frozen into
rigid molds by governmental fiat.26 Furthermore, the Board's
doctrine encourages hypocrisy in negotiations. If a party deeply
desires a concession on a permissive subject that may not legally
be carried to impasse, it will be tempted to hang the bargaining
up on a false issue that happens to enjoy official approbation as
a mandatory topic. Candor would have been enhanced by a dif-
ferent rule, and unresolved disputes would have been recognized
for what they ordinarily become in any case-matters to be de-
cided by economic muscle.
Making all topics subject to the duty (and therefore the
right) of good faith bargaining would of course have won the
case for the employer in Borg-Warner. But it is readily under-
standable why the employer there shrank from such strong
medicine. Ordinarily it would be the union, not the employer,
that would profit most from an expanded range of negotiations.
The right to force good faith bargaining on any topic would en-
able the union to demand bargaining over those most sensitive
of issues, basic business decisions now classified as managerial
prerogatives. On the other hand, even the prospect of bargaining
to an impasse over a business decision would not be the worst
thing that could happen to an employer from the viewpoint of
the sophisticated management attorney. Much worse is to be
told, after the fact, that a business decision unilaterally imple-
mented without prior negotiation with the union involved a
mandatory subject of bargaining, and that the unilateral change
therefore constituted an unfair labor practice that must now be
26. Contemporaneous criticisms of Borg-Warner along these lines were voiced by
Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV.
1057, 1083-86 (1958); Wollett, The Borg-Warner Case and the Role of the NLRB in the
Bargaining Process, N.Y.U. TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 39, 46-51 (1959);
Note, The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 Minn. L. Rev.
1225, 1233-36 (1959); Note, Bargaining on Nonmandatory Topics Constitutes Refusal to
Bargain, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 188, 193 (1958).
[Vol. 581306
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undone at some substantial expense to the company.17 Such in-
deed was the ill fortune of numerous employers during the
1960's, when the NLRB significantly enlarged the scope of re-
quired bargaining. The wiser course might well have been to end
the confusion and uncertainty by treating all lawful subjects as
mandatory. But that was the road not taken.
A second, more modest approach would also have allowed
the employer in Borg-Warner to prevail. That was the position
adopted by Justice Harlan and three other Justices,2" who would
have retained the mandatory-permissive distinction, but with a
difference. Either party would still be required to bargain to an
impasse about mandatory subjects but not about permissive
subjects, as is the case under the existing law. At the same time,
however, either party under the Harlan formulation could per-
sist in pursuing any lawful demand, regardless of how the Board
might categorize it, and could refuse to contract absent agree-
ment on that item. In short, Justice Harlan read section 8(d) of
the NLRA to mean what it says, and only that: A party is obli-
gated to bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions,
but an insistence on bargaining about more is not the equivalent
of a refusal to bargain about a mandatory subject. A union, for
example, could dismiss out of hand an employer's demand for a
secret-ballot strike vote procedure, but the employer would not
commit an unfair labor practice if it remained adamant.
Either of these two approaches would probably have com-
ported better with the realities of collective bargaining than does
the law as now propounded. If it is too late in the day to press
for fundamental revisions, at least a recognition of past missteps
may help guide our future course aright.
27. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Ameri-
can Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973) (which rejected management's uni-
lateral decisions and required that the issues be resolved by collective bargaining). In the
exercise of its discretion, however, the Board often did not order a financially troubled
employer to restore the status quo ante. E.g., Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294
(1962).
28. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Harlan, J., joined by Clark,
J., and Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1984] 1307
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III. MANAGERIAL DECISIONS AND EMPLOYEE JOB SECURITY
The mandatory subjects of bargaining are wages, hours, and
working conditions.29 It is now well established that wages in-
clude compensation in almost every conceivable form, from
straight hourly wages 0 through the most complex pension
plan,31 not to mention the traditional Christmas turkey.3 2 Hours
cover not only the total number of hours in a day or a week, but
also the times of particular shifts,33 the scheduling of overtime,34
and the like. Working conditions plainly encompass such physi-
cal aspects of the job ae heat and cold, dirt and noise, lighting,
safety hazards, and other assorted stresses and strains.3 5 But
over the last two decades, the most controversial issue concern-
ing the duty to bargain has been the extent to which employers
must negotiate about managerial decisions that result in a
shrinkage of job opportunities for employees. Under the Borg-
Warner rubric, the crucial question is whether a subject is clas-
sified as a condition of employment or as a management right.3 6
For a long time the NLRB held that in the absence of anti-
union animus, employers were not required to bargain over deci-
sions to subcontract, relocate operations, or introduce technolog-
ical improvements. Their only requirement was to negotiate
regarding the effects of such decisions on the employees dis-
placed. Layoff schedules, severance pay, and transfer rights were
thus bargainable, but the basic decision to discontinue or change
an operation was not.3 7 Under the so-called Kennedy-Johnson
Board, however, a whole range of managerial decisions were re-
classified as mandatory subjects of bargaining. These included
29. See supra text accompanying note 19.
30. Gray Line, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 88 (1974), enforced in part, 512 F.2d 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
31. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949), noted in 43 Ill. L. Rev. 713 (1948) and 58 Yale L.J. 803
(1949).
32. E.g., K-D Mfg. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 57 (1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1969).
33. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); see also Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 691 (1965).
34. Colonial Press, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 852, 860-61 (1973).
35. E.g., NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967) (safety rules).
36. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
37. E.g., Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1959), enforced, 287 F.2d 17 (10th
Cir. 1961); Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941).
1308 [Vol. 58
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decisions to terminate a department and subcontract its work,ss
decisions to consolidate operations through automation, 9 and
decisions to close one plant of a multiplant enterprise. 4° The key
seems to have been whether the employer's action would result
in a "significant impairment of job tenure, employment security,
or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the
bargaining unit. '41
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 42 the Su-
preme Court gave limited approval to this shift of direction. The
Court sustained a bargaining order issued when a manufacturer
wished to subcontract out its maintenance work within a plant.
The Court emphasized that the subcontracting did not alter the
company's "basic operation" or require any "capital invest-
ment. ' 43 It simply involved a replacement of one group of em-
ployees with another group to do the same work in the same
place under the same general supervision. Bargaining would not
"significantly abridge" the employer's "freedom to manage the
business. 44
One court of appeals, elaborating on this rationale, held
that there was no duty to bargain about subcontracting involv-
ing a "change in the capital structure. '45 Other courts of ap-
peals, in cases of partial shutdowns and relocations, attempted
to balance such factors as the severity of any adverse impact on
unit jobs, the extent and urgency of the employer's economic
need, and the likelihood that bargaining would be productive.46
38. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1963).
39. Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
40. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
41. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576 (1965).
42. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
43. Id. at 213.
44. Id. An unusually influential separate concurrence by Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices Douglas and Harlan, limited Fibreboard to its facts and emphasized that the
Court was not deciding that "subcontracting decisions are as a general matter subject to
[the] duty [to bargain]." 379 U.S. at 218. Specifically, Fibreboard did not involve one of
the "managerial decisions ... which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." Id. at
223.
45. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966). See also UAW Local 864 v. NLRB (General Motors Corp.), 470 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (manufacturer's "sale" of dealership); NLRB v. Transmarine Nav.
Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967) (relocation); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,
350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (plant shutdown).
46. NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979) and
1984] 1309
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This approach had the attraction of maximizing fairness in indi-
vidual situations, but it could often lead to uncertainty and
unpredictability.
In 1981 the Supreme Court reconsidered the problem, with
puzzling results. In First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB,4 7 the Court held that a maintenance firm did not have to
bargain when it decided to terminate an unprofitable contract to
provide janitorial services to a nursing home. The Court first
stated broadly that an employer has no duty to bargain about a
decision "to shut down part of its business purely for economic
reasons." 48 It then pointed out that in this particular case the
operation was not being moved elsewhere and the laid-off em-
ployees were not going to be replaced, the employer's dispute
with the nursing home concerned the size of a management fee
over which the union had no control, and because the union had
only recently been certified there was no disruption of an ongo-
ing relationship. 49 The decision thus leaves unanswered many
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978) (closing one of several
plants); ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Corp.) 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (relo-
cation). Cf. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115
L.R.R.M. 1065, 1066 n.5 (1984) (parties assumed that mid-contract work relocation was
mandatory subject of bargaining but Board majority did not consider it necessary to
decide the issue); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984),
discussed infra note 49. See generally Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in
Operations, 1964 DuKE L.J. 1; Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First
National Maintenance!: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982)
[hereinafter referred to as HARPER]; Heinsz, The Partial-Closing Conundrum: The Duty
of Employers and Unions to Bargain in Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 71; Schwartz, Plant
Relocation or Partial Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REv.
81 (1979); Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination of Operations, 92 HAnv. L.
REv. 768 (1979); Note, Partial Closings: The Scope of an Employer's Duty to Bargain,
61 B.U.L. REV. 735 (1981).
47. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The Court stated, however, that there was "no doubt" the
employer had an obligation to bargain about the "results or effects" of its decision to
halt the operation. Id. at 677 n.15.
48. Id. at 686.
49. Id. at 687-88. Placing no weight on the possible limiting effects of those facts,
the Labor Board gave First National Maintenance a broad reading in Otis Elevator Co.,
269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984). An employer's decision to terminate its
research and development functions at a facility in New Jersey and to relocate and con-
solidate those functions at another facility in Connecticut was held not to be a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board majority emphasized that the employer's
decision "did not turn upon labor costs" but rather "turned upon a fundamental change
in the nature and direction of the business." Id., 115 L.R.R.M. at 1282-83. The decision
was thus "not amenable to bargaining," regardless of its "effect on employees [or] a
union's ability to offer alternatives." Id.
HeinOnline  -- 58 Tul. L. Rev. 1310 1983-1984
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questions regarding the more typical instance of a partial closing
or the removal of a plant to a new location.
The problem in such instances is how to reconcile manage-
ment's interest in running its own business as it sees fit with the
workers' claim to a voice in shaping their industrial lives. Before
I set forth my own views on how such a reconciliation may be
effectuated, one further important technical distinction must be
understood. Whether a particular item is a mandatory subject of
bargaining may arise in two quite different contexts. First, the
union may be seeking a certain provision, either as part of a new
labor contract that is open for negotiation or as an addition to
an existing agreement in mid-term. Second, an employer may
wish to make a unilateral change in its operations, either in the
absence of or in the face of a current collective agreement,
without first having to bargain with the union about the matter.
In both of these contexts the Supreme Court has apparently as-
sumed, with little or no analysis, that the scope or ambit of
mandatory subjects is the same.50 That is to say, if the item in
question is one about which the union could demand bargaining,
then generically it is the sort of matter that an employer may
not unilaterally change at any time without prior notice to the
union and good faith efforts to negotiate an agreement concern-
ing it. This doctrine is susceptible of several refinements de-
pending on the terms of the existing agreement, the extent of
pre-contract discussions, and the scope of any union waivers or
management rights clauses. 51 For our purposes, however, the im-
portant point is that in determining the range of mandatory
subjects of bargaining, we are not merely deciding what the par-
ties are obligated to deal with at the time a contract is initially
negotiated. To a significant degree we are also deciding what
limits shall be imposed on the employer's freedom and business
flexibility during the two or three years of the contract's life. Let
us now turn to the principles and practicalities that should be
considered in making that determination.
50. E.g., Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 185-88 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Leroy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964) (waiver through manage-
ment rights clause); Proctor Mfg. Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1169 (1961); Jacobs Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). See also R. GORMAN,
supra note 23, at 466-80 (on waiver).
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IV. ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Imposing a duty to bargain about managerial decisions such
as plant removals, technological innovation, and subcontracting
(or "outsourcing," to use the current jargon) would obviously de-
lay transactions, reduce business adaptability, and perhaps in-
terfere with the confidentiality of negotiations with third par-
ties. In some instances bargaining would be doomed in advance
as a futile exercise. Nonetheless, the closer we move toward rec-
ognizing that employees may have something akin to a property
interest in their jobs,52 the more apparent it may become that
not even the employer's legitimate regard for profit-making or
the public's justified concern for a productive economy should
totally override the workers' claim to a voice in the decisions of
ongoing enterprises that will vitally affect their future employ-
ment opportunities.53 A moral value is arguably at stake in de-
termining whether employees may be treated as pawns in man-
agement decisons.5 4 On a crasser, tactical level, a leading
management attorney of my acquaintance once said that long
before the Supreme Court's decision on in-plant subcontracting,
he "Fibre boarded" the unions he dealt with simply as a matter
of sound personnel relations.
From the workers' perspective, the opportunity to bargain
before a decision is made could be crucial. Unions. will lose con-
siderable leverage in bargaining about even the effects of a busi-
ness change if the employer can present them with a fait accom-
pli in the change itself. Oftentimes negotiations may benefit
both parties by producing a less drastic solution than a shut-
down or a relocation. For example, one of the most dramatic mo-
ments during the 1982 Ford-UAW negotiations occurred when a
union representative from the plant level and his opposite num-
ber from the management side agreed that not once had the two
52. See, e.g., AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismis-
sal, 36 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 170 (1981) (employer's right to terminate employee at will);
Symposium, Individual Rights in the Workplace: the Employment-at-Will Issue, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 199 (1983) (same).
53. An employer apparently has no duty to bargain about a decision to go out of
business completely. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 267 n.5
(1965).
54. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 8-9
(1948) [hereinafter referred to as N. CHAMBERLAIN].
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of them failed to find a way to adjust operations so as to keep
work within the shop and not have it contracted out. At the very
least, bargaining may serve a therapeutic purpose. As the Su-
preme Court stated in Fibreboard, in words that might sound
platitudinous but for the grim historical reality behind them, the
NLRA "was framed with an awareness that refusals to confer
and negotiate had been one of the most prolific causes of indus-
trial strife. '55
Despite these advantages of collective bargaining, neither
organized labor nor collective bargaining has ever enjoyed full
acceptance in this country. Unions are feared by many employ-
ers and distrusted by much of the public.5 6 Their support today
even among workers is lower than at any time during the past
half century. For several years they have lost over fifty percent
of all the representation elections conducted by the NLRB, and
their membership has shrunk to only one-fifth of the total labor
force, not even half the proportionate strength of unions in most
of Western Europe.57
There is keen irony here. Ours is the most conservative,
least ideological of all labor movements, traditionally committed
to the capitalistic system and to the principle that management
should have the primary responsibility for managing2.5 Yet em-
ployers will pay millions of dollars to experts in "union avoid-
ance" in order to maintain their nonunion status. 59 In part this
resistance is attributable to the highly decentralized character of
American industrial relations. Because of this decentralization,
an employer typically must confront a union on a one-to-one ba-
sis, without the protective shield of an associaton to negotiate on
behalf of all or substantially all the firms in a particular indus-
55. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
56. Opinion polls in the 1970's showed that there was no other major institution in
our society whose leadership so consistently lacked the confidence of the general public.
Ladd, The Polls: The Question of Confidence, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 544, 545 (1977).
57. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 270-72 (1980). The percentage of unionized workers in the
United States has declined rather steadily since 1947, from 23.9 percent of the total
labor force in that year (33.7 percent of nonagricultural employment) to 19.7 percent in
1978 (about 23.6 percent of nonagricultural employment). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2070, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATITIcs-1980 at 412.
58. See LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 4-5 passim (C. Rehmus, D. McLaughlin &
F. Nesbitt rev. ed. 1978).
59. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1776-86 (1983).
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try, as is true in Western Europe. In part the resistance to union
organization here may result, among both employers and work-
ers, from ingrained American attitudes of rugged individualism
and the ideal of the classless society. 0
In any event, it seems plain that aversion to unionism can
hardly be supported by a dispassionate analysis of the actual im-
pact of collective bargaining in this country. Indeed, for many
years labor economists wrangled over whether any significant ec-
onomic effect could be demonstrated. Today, however, there is
an emerging consensus, which was reflected in a volume pro-
duced in 1981 by the Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion.6 1 This volume assessed U.S. industrial relations over the
last three decades, during which time collective bargaining could
be said to have come of age. To no one's surprise, unionism was
not found to have brought about any substantial redistribution
of wealth as between labor and capital. It has achieved a wage
level that is roughly ten to twenty percent higher for union
workers,6 2 but that differential is largely offset by increased effi-
ciency and greater productivity in unionized firms. Furthermore,
unions have not been an initiating cause of inflation in the post-
World War II period, although they may have hampered efforts
to combat it.63 Last, to mention a point that I must concede is at
least superficially damaging to my thesis, union workers general-
ly find less satisfaction in their jobs than do similarly situated
nonunion workers. 4 On the other hand, union members are
more likely to say they would never consider changing jobs. Per-
haps the solution to this paradox, as suggested by Richard Free-
man and James Medoff, is that "the collective voice of unionism
provides workers with a channel for expressing their preferences
to management and that this increases their willingness to com-
plain about undesirable conditions." 65
60. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1458-62 (1971).
61. Freeman & Medoff, The Impact of Collective Bargaining: Illusion or Reality?
in U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 50-56, 59-61 (J.
Stieber, R. McKersie & D. Mills eds. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as U.S. INDUS. REL.].
62. Id. See also A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 74, 89-90 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter referred to as A. REES].
63. Mitchell, Collective Bargaining and the Economy, in U.S. INDUS. REL., supra
note 61, at 25-26, 33-35.
64. Freeman & Medoff, U.S. INDUS. REL., supra note 61, at 58-59.
65. Id.
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For many observers of the labor scene, the major achieve-
ment of collective bargaining has not been economic at all. It has
been the creation of the grievance and arbitration system, a for-
malized procedure whereby labor and management may resolve
disputes arising during the term of a collective agreement, either
by voluntary settlements between the parties themselves or by
reference to an impartial outsider, without resort to economic
force or court litigation.6 6 The mere existence of a grievance and
arbitration system helps to eradicate such former abuses as fa-
voritism, arbitrary or ill-informed decisionmaking, and outright
discrimination in the workplace.
My conclusion from these facts is that collective bargaining
has promoted both industrial peace and broader worker partici-
pation in the governance of the shop, while simultaneously stim-
ulating higher productivity and causing only modest dislocations
in the economy generally. At the same time I believe that the
true potential of collective bargaining has not been tapped. Be-
cause law serves such an important legitimating function in our
society, collective bargaining may have been seriously under-
mined when the courts began to cut back the scope of
mandatory bargaining to exclude managerial decisions even
though they might have a substantial effect on employees' job
security.
Peter Pestillo, Ford Motor Company's able, dynamic vice-
president for labor relations, has mused: "U.S. labor relations
are too little people-driven and too much law-driven. '67 That
may be regrettable, but it seems the reality. Ironically, the legal
duty to bargain is now more hindrance than help to a well-en-
trenched union. Without it, the union could demand bargaining
on anything it wished; with it, bargaining is by leave of the em-
ployer on everything outside the prescribed list of "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." Far better, it
seems to me, would have been an open-ended mandate that lets
the parties themselves decide what their vital interests are.6
66. See, e.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 463-65
(1970); A. REES, supra note 62, at 187 (discussing the economic and political benefits of
unionism); Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1979, at
69, 70.
67. As quoted in a letter from Malcolm L. Denise, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan to
author (March 10, 1982).
68. An excellent, more conventional solution is proposed in Harper, supra note 46.
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The only exclusions from compulsory bargaining that I would
readily admit are matters going to the very existence or identity
of the negotiating parties, such as the membership of a corpora-
tion's board of directors, and perhaps the integrity of their inter-
nal structure and procedure. Those limitations would preserve
the holding in Borg-Warner,69 which adopted the mandatory-
permissive dichotomy in the first place.
My argument for a more sweeping and wide-open duty to
bargain is grounded in two considerations, one a matter of eco-
nomics and industrial relations policy, and the other a matter of
social policy, if not of ethics. I shall deal with them in turn.
He would exclude from the scope of compulsory bargaining only "product market deci-
sions," which he defines as "all decisions to determine what products are created and
sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at what prices." Id. at 1463. He bases
this principle on a "social policy allowing consumers, and only consumers, to influence
management's product market decisions." Id.
There is much merit in Professor Harper's thesis, and he demonstrates its feasibility
and conformity to precedent in a variety of contexts. Nonetheless, as he seems to recog-
nize, it may unduly circumscribe bargaining for a class of employees that will become
increasingly significant in the post-industrial world-artists and artisans, educators, en-
tertainers, and customer service personnel generally-in short, all those employees
"whose identity and behavior . . . define the product." Id. at 1467-68. Thus, Professor
Harper would not make safety rules a mandatory topic for professional football players,
or the scantiness of costume for cocktail waitresses. Id. at 1466. The logic here may be
impeccable, but it leads one to question the soundness of the premise which so exalts
consumer interests over employee interests.
Professor Harper's proposal for a product market principle might also have the the-
oretical advantage of providing a rational basis for distinguishing between union-em-
ployer activity that is and is not subject to the antitrust laws. But the Supreme Court
has apparently rejected the notion of such a sharp labor market-product market dichot-
omy; even an agreement concerning wages may violate the Sherman Act if "predatory
intent" is present. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), on remand sub nom. Lewis
v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 400 F.2d
806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968); Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 620
F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1981). See generally Handler &
Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor
Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1981) (advocating broad formulation of the labor
antitrust exemption to include all collectively bargained agreements except those that
directly affect the product market); Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV.
1183 (1980) (court should find antitrust violation only if act is part of a plan to control
the product market); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law,
62 VA. L. REV. 603, 610 (1976) (antitrust violation exists only when there is a definite
plan to injure business competitors). If predatory intent is indeed the key to a union-
employer antitrust violation, then of course the particular subject matter of the agree-
ment is not a crucial factor.
69. See supra text accompanying note 24. Under my test, however, First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (termination of maintenance at nurs-
ing home), would have to be overruled or treated as a sport.
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V. INDIVIDUAL VOICE IN THE WORKPLACE
During the late 1960's American management became
alarmed by signs of growing alienation, even militancy, on the
part of workers. Although this unrest was much exaggerated, it
fueled an effort by many companies to enhance the Quality of
Work Life (QWL) by increasing employee participation in job-
centered decisionmaking. The interest in such programs was in-
tensified during the 1970's by glowing accounts of the capacity
of Japanese industry to improve both the quantity and quality
of production by fostering an almost filial relationship between
employee and employer. Altogether, it is estimated that one-
third of the companies in the Fortune 500 have established pro-
grams in participative management.70 Furthermore, in certain
countries, such as Sweden and West Germany, worker participa-
tion is guaranteed by statute.71 More and more studies attest
that it is simply smart business to heed the voice of the individ-
ual employee and to give him or her a stake in the successful
operation of the enterprise. 72 Like the student using the library
designed by the great architect, the worker on the production
line will spot flaws that have escaped the eye of the keenest in-
dustrial engineer.
Participative management or QWL programs have undoubt-
edly been used by some companies to counter the appeal of la-
bor unions. 73 Nevertheless, several major international unions
have become involved in such projects. As of 1980 General Mo-
tors and the UAW had programs under way in fifty separate
plants.74 Some locations registered remarkable gains in employee
morale and performance. In addition, the new contract signed in
70. Wallace & Driscoll, Social Issues in Collective Bargaining, in U.S. INDUS. REL.,
supra note 61, at 199, 241.
71. Bergqvist, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in Swe-
den, 5 CoMP. LAB. L. 65 (1982); Richardi, Worker Participation in Decisions Within
Undertakings in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 23, 29-31 (1982).
72. Wallace & Driscoll, supra note 70, at 238, 241. For varying appraisals see Good-
man, Quality of Work Life Projects in the 1980s, 31 LAB. L.J. 487 (1980); Locke &
Schweiger, Participation in Decision-Making: One More Look, in 1 RESEARCH IN ORGAN-
IZATION BEHAVIOR 271 (B. Staw ed. 1979); Merrifield, Worker Participation in Decisions
Within Undertakings, 5 CoMp. LAB. L. 1 (1982); Summers, Worker Participation in the
U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 367 (1980); Workers' Participation in Management: An International Com-
parison, 18 INDUS. REL. 247 (1979).
73. Wallace & Driscoll, supra note 70, at 242-51.
74. Id. at 245.
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1982 by Ford Motor Company and the UAW provides for "Mu-
tual Growth Forums," at both national and local levels, consist-
ing of joint union-management committees for the "advance dis-
cussion of certain business developments of material interest
and significance to the union, the employees, and the
company."75
The anomaly is that many of these developments, evidently
so beneficial to management, might well be classified as "permis-
sive" subjects of bargaining by the NLRB or the courts. A union
could not bring them to the bargaining table without the acqui-
escence of the employer. Of course, as long as the parties are
cooperative, that is a moot point. But the law should be struc-
tured to deal with the case where regulation is necessary, not
where it is superfluous. Even on so-called managerial decisions,
such as revising the layout of a trim department in an auto as-
sembly plant, the workers' input has often proved valuable.7 6
The law ought not insulate the employer from bargaining merely
because he rejects that lesson.
One worrisome objection to my prescription is that it may
unduly restrict a company's autonomy after a contract has been
agreed upon. If an item is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the employer is not only obligated to negotiate when a contract
is executed but may also be precluded from instituting a unilat-
eral change during the life of the agreement.77 This result would
be opposed by those who believe that once an employer has ful-
filled its duty to bargain and has signed a contract, it should be
entitled to treat all contract terms as settled.78 Unless restricted
by some particular provision, a company should be entirely free,
under this view, to act unilaterally without further bargaining.
Two answers can be given to this objection. First, an employer
can preserve its autonomy by securing a suitably broad "man-
agement rights" clause as part of the initial settlement. Second,
even if the employer must bargain, there is no obligation to
agree. After a good faith effort has been put forth, and the nego-
75. Solidarity, Mar. 1982, at 8.
76. Wallace & Driscoll, supra note 70, at 246.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
78. Cf. Cox & Dunlop, Duty to Bargain, supra note 11, at 1116-20 (collective bar-
gaining agreement should be construed to require continuance of major terms of employ-
ment not included within agreement but which existed at the time of the formulation of
the agreement; differing management and union views are discussed).
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tiations carried to impasse, the employer may proceed to make
the change he desires. The period of bargaining may be short if
the circumstances warrant.79 The union and the employees
would have had their say, and the law requires no more.
A quarter century ago a classic study on industrial relations
concluded: "An important result of the American system of col-
lective bargaining is the sense of participation that it imparts to
workers. ' 8 0 More recently, a group of younger scholars, describ-
ing themselves as "critical labor law theorists," has expressed
the view that "collective bargaining law articulates an ideology
that aims to legitimate and justify unnecessary and destructive
hierarchy and domination in the workplace." '81 Some perspective
on these polar positions can be gleaned from surveys indicating
that the workers themselves would rather deal with safety and
health than with the design of their jobs. 2 Yet perhaps the most
richly textured sense of how workers feel about their jobs comes
from hearing them speak for themselves. Listen to an auto
worker as transcribed by Studs Terkel: "What it drains out of a
human being, the car ain't worth it. But I think of a certain area
of proudness. You see them on that highway, you don't look and
see what model it is or whose car it is. I put my labor in it." 85
For me, in the end, the issue comes down to the social val-
ues, to the human values. It is good to know that giving the indi-
vidual a voice in the shaping and operation of his job may be
79. I have examined nine contested NLRB cases during the 1970's in which an
employer instituted unilateral changes after bargaining "to impasse." Elapsed times from
the employer's initial notification of an impending change or first meeting with the union
to the implementation of the change ranged from three weeks to six months. Three cases
took three weeks; five took between four and eight weeks; and one took six months. The
median was six and one-half weeks, which in the usual situation would hardly seem very
onerous. More empirical data on the practical effect of such delays plainly would be
desirable.
80. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. R. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING ON MANAGEMENT 960 (1960).
81. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 452 (1981). See generally, Dubofsky, Legal The-
ory and Workers' Rights: A Historian's Critique, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 496 (1981); Ken-
nedy, Critical Labor Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503 (1981); KLARE, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978); Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor
Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483 (1981). Cf. J. ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 143-56 (1983).
82. Wallace & Driscoll, supra note 70, at 239-40.
83. S. TERKEL, WORKING 177 (1974).
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sound industrial relations and may enhance efficiency and pro-
ductivity. But I think there is considerably more at stake than
simple economic concerns. My emphasis on noneconomic factors
is neither novel nor quixotic. A generation ago a hard-headed
labor expert, Neil Chamberlain, declared that "the workers'
struggle for increasing participation in business decisions ... is
highly charged with an ethical content.... [L]egal and economic
arguments, technological and political considerations must give
way before widely held moral convictions." ' 4 I am little troubled
that some workers, in answering the pollsters' canned questions,
assigned a "low priority" to involvement in decisions about job
content, or that their initial reaction was that a car "ain't worth"
the pain. Allowed to elaborate, they still find a "certain area of
proudness"; they have put their "labor in it." Really, they have
no choice. It is primarily work that defines a man or woman."
No amount of leisure time before the television set or on a Flor-
ida beach can compensate for that. Ultimately, what any of us
says or does about our work may not matter much. What will be
important is that we shall have had a voice. The worker deserves
no less.
Finally, I cannot accept the romantic notion that individual
employees should somehow renounce the social compact and re-
vert to a state of nature, shaking off the shackles of collective
bargaining and disowning our orderly, hierarchical grievance-
solving mechanisms. The challenge, as I see it, is to provide the
individual a voice without producing cacophony, to ensure a civ-
ilized confrontation and resolution of issues, by peaceful strikes
if necessary, but without the guerrilla warfare of wildcat work
stoppages. The modern union may exhibit bureaucratic tenden-
cies that some find distasteful, but the contemporary world is
hardly a place for the swashbuckling adventurer or undisciplined
marauding band. Whether called a guild, a society of journey-
men and apprentices, or a labor union, a settled institutional
means has usually afforded working people the fullest expression
84. N. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 54, at 8-9.
85. Studies have found that "most, if not all, working people tend to describe
themselves in terms of the work groups or organizations to which they belong. The ques-
tion 'Who are you?' often elicits an organizationally related response.... Occupational
role is usually a part of this response for all classes: 'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm a law-
yer."' SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
WORK IN AMERICA 6 (1973).
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of their common goals and their most effective voice. 6 The law
would do the worker no. favor to ignore that history.
86. See, e.g., Freeman & Medoff, supra note 66, at 71-72 (espousing the model of
union as collective voice). See generally S. & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 840-50
(1920) (unionism and democracy); S. & B. WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1-63
(1920) (origins of trade unions). Cf. E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORK-
ING CLASS 500-21 (1966) (resistance to the Combination Acts by the artisans and skilled
laborers in 19th century England).
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